Nuclear Weapons: Origin and Evolution

Introduction -

    In this introductory paper, we intend to sketch out the broad context and background against which
the issues of nuclear weapons and the millennium will be discussed by giving a brief history of nuclear weapons. We will say what they are and where they came from, how the large Cold War arsenals were built up, and what they were supposed to do. There is a great deal that could be said on this topic and on the corresponding period of history - from Hiroshima in 1945 to the 'official' end of the Cold War with the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 - and indeed a great deal has been said (the best introductory books are Rhodes 1986,and Friedman 1989). What follows is thus the barest of bare bones.

The Canberra Commission on Nuclear Weapons

Introduction -

   The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998 did three things: firstly, they raised, to a dangerously new level, the stakes in the long conflict between those two countries; secondly, they shattered any complacency we might have had about the world being safe from nuclear warfare now that the Cold War was over; and thirdly, the Indian and Pakistani precedent heralded the prospect that other states, too, might seek to break ranks and become nuclear weapon powers, thus unravelling the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 which sought to prevent the further spread of these weapons. India and Pakistan had never signed the NPT and so were technically not in breach of it. Almost all other states, however, had agreed to the NPT and if the South Asian tests were to encourage other states (for example Syria, Iraq, Iran or North Korea) to 'go nuclear' openly, it would have extremely damaging consequences for the treaty.

Acquienscence or Abolition?  Nuclear Weapons and the Non-Proliferation Treaty Regine

Introduction -

    The shocks caused by the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons testing of 1998 have reverberated deeply and rapidly. Apprehensions include implications for the flashpoint that is disputed Kashmir; the unpredictability of a setting where, with China included, we now have a unique juxtaposition of three adjoining states possessing nuclear weapons; and, to aggravate these concerns, possible emulation by potential proliferators within a neighbourhood that includes Iran (Walker 1998: 506). Some see the tests partly explicable as the legacy of major power failure to adequately assist in a resolution of South Asia's security differences (Hu 1998: 2).  That consideration may have merit, but it did nothing to lessen a torrent of international condemnation, including a statement signed by 47 governments before the Geneva Conference on Disarmament insisting the tests were totally 'irreconcilable with claims by both countries that they are committed to nuclear disarmament' (Pearson 1998).

Nuclear Development in the Asia-Pacific After the Cold War

Introduction -

    Two points immediately stand out when surveying the contemporary politico-strategic architecture of the Asia-Pacific: the prevalence of actual and latent inter-state rivalries; and the paucity of multilateral regional security arrangements. These attributes are hardly unique to the post-Cold War era, but they have been accentuated by the demise of East-West confrontation in the Asia-Pacific. As Mohan Malik (1997:55) has observed, 'the emergence of a multipolar strategic environment raises the possibility that historical animosities, unsettled boundary disputes, and disagreements over access to resources could erupt into conventional warfare for limited ends in the decades ahead'. While the Asia-Pacific was characterised by conflict and instability for much of the Cold War period (see Morley, 1986), a strong sense of uncertainty now pervades the dynamics of regional relations.

Shifting Nuclear Debates: From Fortress Australia to Virtual Capacity

Introduction -

    Conventional wisdom holds that Australia has a proud record in the nuclear non-proliferation field.  Just in the past five years one could note the Canberra Commission, Australia's efforts in negotiations over the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and strongly voiced objections from successive governments to nuclear weapons testing by France, China, India and Pakistan. Others have questioned Australia's record. Critics of uranium mining and export point to loopholes in the international non-proliferation and safeguards regime, the centre-pieces of which are the NPT and the safeguards operations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Likewise the military/nuclear alliance with the US ties Australia to international nuclear politicking and proliferation.

Thinking about Nuclear Weapons - Beyond the Millennium

Introduction -

    To round out this collection of essays, we are going to engage in a little speculation - we hope the reader will indulge us in this! We shall begin by noting that there is good and bad speculation and try to see what the difference is in terms of an example which is by now fan1iliar: The dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These are objective historical facts, so it seems that there can be no uncertainty about them. However, to this day there is considerable disputation about reasons: Why were the bombs dropped? What precisely was the advice given to President Truman? What exactly was the nature of the advice that swayed Truman's decision? (As an example of the controversy still generated by those events, we can mention a recent exhibition that was put on at the Smithsonian Institute in Washington dealing with the bombing.  The exhibition was intended to be both commemorative and educational, but such was the furore that met the educational part that the exhibition had to be closed and its director resigned. See Harwit, 1996).